Divided Skies: Congress vs. the Army on Drone Strategy
How a proposed Drone Corps could impact military effectiveness
The Army and Congress are at odds over the future of drones in our military.
If the wrong decision is made, it could have disastrous consequences for our military’s ability to fight and win wars.
I love drones. I was an early adopter of their use (particularly small unmanned aerial systems or sUAS—but also larger ones) in the military.
Both sides agree that they are critical to our future force. Both sides agree that it’s an urgent issue needing attention. Similarly, both sides agree that adversarial drones represent a major threat to our forces and that we need to focus efforts on countering enemy systems.
But there’s a fight over how to best do this.
Drone Corps
Last week, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) voted to send the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to the House of Representatives for approval.
The NDAA authorizes appropriations for defense-related tasks. Despite my saying that it “authorizes appropriations,” don’t confuse it with an actual appropriations bill carrying budget authority. The NDAA establishes programs and directs the DoD in how it will spend its money once an appropriations bill passes (if we don’t get stuck in the doom-cycle of continuing resolutions).
The HASC held its committee markup of the NDAA to review over 700 amendments! Many of those approved are laudable indeed.
Included in the amendments was a proposal from the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, referred to as Section 913 which would require the Department of the Army to establish a Drone Corps, and elevate it to the level of a “basic branch” similar to infantry, corps of engineers, armor branch, military intelligence, and others.
Section 913
As it’s written, the section establishes a new team within the Army specifically for handling drones. This branch would be overseen by a Chief of the Drone Corps, chosen by the Secretary of the Army. The branch would manage various drone programs including small-, tactical-, and medium-sized unmanned systems and would also be responsible for managing counter-drone programs.
This Drone Corps would
Lead research and development of drone and counter-drone technology.
Ensure other parts of the Army that don’t usually use drones start to do so.
Train soldiers and recruit talented and skilled drone operators, mechanics, and makers into the branch.
Army Response
What the proposed legislation would do, seems necessary, so what’s the Army saying?
First, I think it’s important to highlight that Army leaders agree with the intent behind the legislation—that these are urgent problems that need quickly addressed.
During an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security to weeks ago, Undersecretary of the Army Gabe Camarillo acknowledged this, stating:
I did see the language in the initial draft of the House bill. And I would say that it’s animated, I think, by a recognition that you know this is a very real threat. It is a problem that the Department [of Defense] and the Army in particular have to confront. And so we … share that urgency and we definitely share that focus
The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Randy George has stated bluntly:
But I don’t think it would be helpful to have a separate drone branch.
This puts us in a situation wherein the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA) is facing off against Army senior leaders—namely Undersecretary Hon. Camarillo and Gen. George. Both sides want what’s best for the Army and our future fighting forces.
So, where does Building our Defense come down on this topic?
Building our Defense’s Take
Creating a separate branch of the Army to handle drone and counter-drone warfare is not the right direction for our forces.
I commend the Subcommittee and HASC’s commitment to ensuring the best capabilities and organizations for our military, but this one is likely not right. There are two reasons that I’m opposed to it.
Manpower Constraints:
The Army’s manpower is largely “zero-sum,” meaning that resources for this new branch will have to come at a cost to other branches, many of which are already stretched thin. The most recent Total Army Analysis sees shrinking the force structure (every slot in the Army that could be filled) from 494,000 to 470,000 by 2029. While at first blush, that might seem like good news, as we could just keep the cap higher and use those positions to man the new branch, the reality is that the authorized strength of the Army is well below that, capped currently at 445,000. In other words, we’re already short on personnel in the Army and in existing branches. Creating a new one will exacerbate that problem.
Reduced Capabilities:
The consolidation of drone and counter-drone capabilities in a single branch will limit the knowledge transfer between soldiers, units, and organizations, weakening the overall effectiveness. Efficiencies gained in consolidating training come at the sacrifice of effectiveness on the battlefield.
Instead of creating a consolidated branch to manage drone and counter-drone capabilities and warfare, I propose instead that we universalize the capability. Just as every Soldier must be proficient with a rifle (or in some instances a pistol), a radio, first aid, and other skills, so too should every Soldier maintain proficiency in launching, flying, and recovering small drones.
To this end, instead of creating a separate Drone Corps, the Army should establish a new Warrior Skill Level 1 task (meaning it’s applicable to all Soldiers) for basic drone operations. It should then create a Warrior Skill Level 2 task (first line supervisors) for advanced drone operations.
Next, we need to wisely purchase capability buckets (instead of specific systems) that can be rapidly updated or replaced. We need tens-of-thousands of FPV drones. We need thousands of larger drones. We need different sensors and effectors. We need flexibility in acquisitions and procurement. We need to accelerate funding for unfunded requests and operational needs (like counter-drone systems).
Focusing our efforts here will yield far better results and a more capable and lethal force than establishing a drone corps.
Keep Building,
Andrew