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Matthew Bernard's avatar

Well written article. We are definitely overstating the case on being a leading state sponsor of terror and it is hard to imagine us sleep walking into another armed conflict when we haven’t finished up the one we just started. Hoping this remains non kinetic

Leon Liao's avatar

The real issue is not simply whether Cuba has ties with China. The issue is how quickly Washington now turns China’s presence anywhere near the United States into a total security narrative.

Of course the United States has reason to care if Chinese intelligence capabilities are operating from Cuba. No major power would be indifferent to a rival’s surveillance presence close to its homeland. That part is understandable.

But this concern also contains an obvious double standard. The United States has built a dense military, intelligence, radar, missile-defense, rotational-deployment, logistics, and access architecture around China, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, Thailand, Guam, and other Western Pacific nodes. It treats this architecture as normal regional order, yet treats even a limited Chinese presence in Cuba as an intolerable strategic provocation.

But strategic concern is not the same as strategic discipline. A relationship between Cuba and China should be managed through intelligence, diplomacy, counterintelligence, economic engagement, and regional strategy. It should not automatically become another justification for sanctions escalation, carrier deployments, legal indictments, regime-change imagination, or military pressure.

This is where the Cuba case reveals something larger about American statecraft. Washington increasingly treats China’s global presence as a security problem first, even when the underlying relationship may include trade, infrastructure, technology, finance, diplomacy, or ordinary great-power influence. Once everything connected to China becomes a threat, the U.S. response also becomes increasingly militarized.

That is the deeper pattern. America still has enormous hard power, but its strategic state capacity is increasingly being pulled toward coercive instruments. When diplomacy, development finance, industrial policy, institutional attraction, and long-term regional engagement weaken, every geopolitical problem begins to look like a sanctions problem, a military problem, or a regime-pressure problem.

Cuba itself may not be the central issue. The larger issue is that the United States is becoming more tempted to treat Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere as a trigger for coercion rather than as a test of strategic competition. That is not a sign of confident statecraft. It is a sign that tactical pressure is replacing strategic ordering.

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