Mobilizing the Base
What's changed in the Defense Industrial Base
This is part two in Building Our Defense’s exploration of the Defense Industrial Base. You can read part one here:
Mobilizing the Base
I recently stumbled across a passage about the situation of our Defense Industrial Base that is really important to understanding the challenges we face.
Defense Industrial Base mobilization planning, as the term has come to be used, concerns all activities which would be necessary to ensure the success and minimize the burdens of a wartime procurement program. More specifically, it is designed to ensure the availability of all contributory resources—raw materials, labor, power, fuel, transportation, and the like—for the largescale production of munitions, while at the same time maintaining the nation's industrial establishment and supplying essential civilian needs. Planning of this nature envisages widespread controls over the entire economy—controls which would vitally affect all segments of the population and raise important and delicate questions of national policy in many different areas.
In discharging his Defense Industrial Base mobilization planning responsibilities under the National Defense Authorization Act, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) suffers under a number of limitations. He cannot assure the preparation of adequate procurement plans by the National Guard, Air National Guard, Coast Guard and other agencies external or semi-external to the Defense Department, and it was not until very recently that estimates of the these organizations’ wartime needs began to become available as a basis for Defense Industrial Base planning. Moreover, in time of emergency or war the actual execution of the broad plans for industrial mobilization—in contrast to the specific procurement plans—would not be the responsibility of the Defense Department. Throughout most of the planning period it has been taken for granted that general controls over the entire economy would be exercised by one or more specially created wartime superagencies operating under civilian administrators appointed by the President. The Undersecretary has thus been obligated to make Defense Industrial Base mobilization plans for someone else to carry out in time of war. The many doubts as to the nature and number of wartime superagencies, and the extent to which they would adopt the plans prepared by OUSD(A&S), throws a cloud of uncertainty over the whole planning operation.
Another difficulty faced by OUSD(A&S) throughout much of the planning period has been the prevailing climate of public indifference or actual hostility toward measures of any kind which could be described as "preparation for war." The failures of perceived military adventurism in Iraq and Afghanistan, widespread discussion of the costs and causes of the war, assignment of war guilt to "munitions makers and militarists," and faith in disarmament as the only guarantee of peace were among the many conditions which characterized the aftermath of that war. Coupled with these influences were the seeming remoteness of American involvement in any future war and the general preoccupation with peacetime pursuits in the decades of alternate high prosperity and serious recession following the Cold War. On the one hand it has been difficult to arouse any considerable public interest in planning for a hypothetical future war; yet without such interest the appropriations and staff necessary for a thorough planning job have not been available. On the other hand—especially in the early and middle 2010s—it has been virtually impossible to conduct any public discussion of even minimum plans for military preparedness without generating accusations of “militarism” “war mongering,” and the like. A significant section of the general public was suspicious of “war” plans, the “Defense” Department, and other instrumentalities with similar nomenclature which failed to distinguish between aggressive intention an d defensive preparation. Yet widespread public understanding and support would be indispensable to eventual adoption and success of any plans for nationwide industrial mobilization.
That sounds like a pretty accurate description of where we are in terms of revitalizing America’s Industrial Base and the challenges we face.
But I have a confession. Those paragraphs weren’t written after the Cold War, or in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, or in the face of Chinese Military-Civil Fusion. Those paragraphs were written in 1957 as part of the U.S. Army’s History of World War II, in a volume about The Army and Economic Mobilization. I just updated some of the language (War Department > Defense Department, Assistant Secretary of War > USD(A&S), etc).
Of course, there are similarities and differences between that era and the Defense Department's efforts today.
Similarities:
Need for Comprehensive Planning: Both eras required extensive planning to ensure the availability of resources (raw materials, labor, etc.) for large-scale production of military equipment without compromising essential civilian needs.
Government Coordination: The need for coordination between various government agencies, such as the War Department (now Defense Department) and external agencies (like the Navy), mirrors the present-day coordination required between different branches and departments under the Defense umbrella.
Public Perception: Just like the public's indifference or hostility towards war preparation efforts back then, there can be contemporary challenges in garnering public support or interest in defense-related planning due to various factors like war weariness, pacifism, or skepticism about the need for military readiness.
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Differences:
Technological Advances: Today's industrial mobilization planning involves considerations of advanced technology, cybersecurity, and possibly space exploration, which were not primary concerns in the pre-World War II era. The achievements of the United States in the production of munitions and supplies for World War II provided this country, and to a large extent its allies, with a decisive superiority in military power. Moreover, in the process of establishing and attaining its war production objectives, the United States reshaped the structure of its economy and ushered in an era of supertechnology which marked the beginning of a new epoch in history. We will, once again, call on the nation’s ability to produce and we will, once again, benefit economically and technologically from the mobilization of our industrial capacities.
Mobilization of the Industrial Base during World War II saw significant spending across multiple verticals including aircraft, ship, ammunition, vehicles, electronics Global Context: The geopolitical landscape and the nature of threats faced by nations have evolved. Today's Defense Department planning may encompass responses to a wider array of threats, including cyberwarfare, terrorism, and unconventional warfare, beyond conventional military preparedness. Of course, we have entered a new era of great power competition, but the tools that the ‘great powers’ will likely use extend far beyond conventional weapons. We must prepare for the ability to confront both conventional forces and the wider array of threats.
Interconnected Global Economy: The current global economy is far more interconnected than it was in the pre-World War II era. International trade and supply chain dependencies pose both challenges and opportunities for modern industrial mobilization planning. This global economy has also led the United States to outsource much of our manufacturing and industrial bases, which must now be accounted for as we look to rebuild the capabilities necessary to sustain our country in a war. That it has been nearly 30 years of outsourcing, means that we’ve seen an associated degradation in the knowledge base of our workforce. As such, any attempt to mobilize the industrial base means that we’ll have to relearn many lessons around manufacturing and production.
Mobilizing the DIB will require a degree of re-shoring capabilities back to the United States Political and Social Dynamics: The political, social, and cultural contexts surrounding defense planning have significantly changed. Today, there might be different challenges related to political polarization, international alliances, and evolving societal norms.
In essence, while some aspects of industrial mobilization planning from the pre-World War II era might draw parallels with today's Defense Department efforts, the contemporary landscape introduces new complexities and considerations that necessitate a different approach to modern-day defense planning. Future editions will continue to explore those complexities and considerations as we continue Building Our Defense’s coverage of reestablishing our Defense Industrial Base.
Keep Building!
Andrew
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