Replicator, pt 2
Mobilizing industry and the economy
We’ve been talking about Replicator for two weeks now—and I’ll likely be talking about it for a long time to come.
But, for those that haven’t heard the buzz, Kathleen Hicks, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, announced the program two weeks ago, directing a requirement to produce and field “thousands of attritable, autonomous systems across multiple domains within the next two years” as part of a new initiative to better compete with China.
Her announcement has sparked significant discussions within the DoD and broader defense industrial sector. Most commentary has been wildly supportive of the initiative. Some parties with more entrenched interests seem to be pushing back against the directed requirement, with one argument being that the technology can’t successfully navigate the distances required in the Pacific at the price points necessary. Regardless, the conversation is happening (that’s great), and it’s raising some critical questions too.
One such question is “what should be the DoD’s / Government’s role in directly producing these systems?”
Andrew Metrick argued in Breaking Defense last week that the DoD should take a very direct and active role in production.
I’m skeptical of Metrick’s proposals, but I try to maintain “strong opinions, loosely held.” So, I’m open to reconsidering my skepticism.
Regardless, I think we’re at a unique period in time, and likely more similar to the period from 1938 through 1941. World War II had started, and while we hoped we could stay out of the war, we knew we had to prepare.
Similarly, today, we know we must prepare for conflict, even as we work to avoid it. In fact, under deterrence theory, preparation for war builds both the capability and credibility on which deterrence resides.
We ought to study, then, the successes and failures of our economic and industrial mobilization for war during this period.
The U.S. Army’s official history of World War II—a collection of 79 books known informally as the Green Books—includes one on The Army and Economic Mobilization. This is the book in my own collection of Green Books that I thumb through the most, that I reference the most, that I find myself turning to the most.
I’m neither an economist, nor a logistician, but this book carries a tremendous importance to understanding our success in that war and for framing how we’ll need to consider future wars. In the volume’s own words:
The achievements of the United States in the production of munitions and supplies for World War II provided this country, and to a large extent its allies, with a decisive superiority in military power. (xi)
Now, the Green Books were published 12 years after the end of the war. But to read the preface, it could have been written today.
Also, to judge from contemporary news items, the complexities, problems, and misunderstandings associated with military procurement are no less confusing to the general public today than they were during the period of rearmament in the early 1940’s. Although both the nature of the procurement process and the character of military end items have increased in complexity since World War II, most of the current issues and administrative problems have their origins or their counterparts in the last great war. (xi)
Military procurement and acquisitions are confusing, opaque, and complex. There’s no way around that. Yet, we can educate ourselves on it as best as possible and that includes understanding both the origins of these processes and what has worked before.
As I ruminated this weekend on the current situation and DSD Hick’s directed requirement, I decided to turn to the Green Books. As I read through portions that I thought would be pertinent, I came across this gem:
A central ingredient of procurement planning during the interwar period was the selection and "allocation" of existing manufacturing establishments for the production of specific items of procurement in time of war. The allocation system was designed to earmark and prepare specific plants for particular tasks so that a minimum of time would be lost in getting emergency production under way. In addition to saving time, the careful advance selection of qualified facilities would lead to greater output, lower prices, improved quality of production, and a more even distribution of the procurement load. (55)
This planning, selection, and allocation were focused on War Department-run facilities. Maybe this fact strengthens Metrick’s argument. But, I also wonder if this level of planning could be achieved by the DoD across private industry—identifying the capacity of various manufacturing and production shops, identifying levels of support for conflict preparations, planning a range of possible levels of participation, then selecting and “allocating” requirements.
After all, I believe that is part of the intent of Replicator. Beyond an initial procurement of thousands of drones for hundreds of millions of dollars, is the rejuvenation of our production capacity, at scale.
We must push hard on the accelerator of our economy. We must build for our defense.
If you’re engaged in Building our Defense, or if you’re interested in Building our Defense, I want to hear from you! Reach out. Let me know your thoughts on how we should be ramping up production capabilities to meet the mass that our enemies can bring to the fight. And, as always,
keep building!
Andrew