Unleashing Attritable Mass
Overcoming a bureaucratic barrier to innovation
Mass is critical for success in warfare.
The United States lists nine principles of war, mass being one of them.
The United Kingdom calls it “concentration of force.”
The Russians call it Концентрация (concentration).
Heck, even everyone’s favorite dead Prussian (Carl von Clausewitz) dedicates an entire chapter in his seminal treatise On War to the “superiority of numbers,” stating:
We may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state of Europe, for the most talented General to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be.
Developments in autonomous systems promise new levels of mass, but our own processes are hindering its realization.
A Brief History of Mass
Historically, this mass has been achieved by putting lots and lots of soldiers in a formation and having them march towards an enemy. Think of Spartan hoplites, Roman legionnaires, or the Battle of Sterling Bridge as depicted in the movie Braveheart.
As technology advanced and armies introduced rifles, radios, indirect fires, aircraft, and other technological advancements, the concept of mass changed.
It was still important to have a relative combat power advantage over one’s adversary, but that could be achieved by massing the effects of these systems.
An army could disintegrate and disaggregate its forces, infiltrate behind enemy forces, and attack in a coordinated and synchronized manner. To be sure, numbers still mattered; think of the Chinese human waves in the Korean War, or the attempt to have coordinated yet disaggregated mass in the Tet Offensive.
Through the Cold War, the United State (and NATO) acknowledged that the Soviet Union was more capable of massing large armies. To counter this, we sought to offset their mass through technological advantage. Following the disastrous human wave attacks in Korea, President Eisenhower adopted the New Look—the first “offset strategy” that sought to allow reduced military manpower through the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Soviets caught up, and in the 70s/80s, we adopted the second offset strategy. The fruits of this effort included many of the weapons systems that we continue to employ with devastating effect today.
Today, the proliferation of autonomous systems and advancements in other technologies including computer vision enabled navigation have allowed dramatic reductions in the price point to field new weapons. Further, these systems allow an army to achieve massed effects while keeping military manpower lower. It’s not infeasible to imagine ratios of hundreds-to-one between autonomous systems and humans.
Our adversaries are investing heavily in the proliferation of these systems for military use. China has military factories for mass producing drones, has military academies for training FPV pilots en masse, and is creating new drone technology regularly. Iran is rapidly becoming one of the leading exporters of attack drones, with its Shahed-136 costing an estimated $20,000 to build and selling for up to 20x that price. Russia is building factories to mass-produce the Shahed, and is currently estimated to produce hundreds of them each month.
In short, our enemies are counting on mass to defeat us. To counter that, we’ll need an appropriate level of mass as well.
Enter Attritable Mass and Replicator
Recently, the concept of attritable mass has emerged in the west as the counter to mass-deployed autonomous systems. Attritable mass involves the development and deployment of affordable unmanned systems, mass-produced and designed to overwhelm enemy defenses, with the understanding that many of these systems may be lost or destroyed in the course of operations.
The strategy of attritable mass gained significant support and traction last summer when former DIU director (and Building our Defense subscriber) Michael Brown and Rear Admiral (Ret) Lorin Selby crafted and released their ‘Hedge Strategy’ and received an accelerating in the fall when Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced the Replicator Initiative. Replicator can be transformative for our defense industrial base, in addition to providing us with an immediate capability.
Of course, while attritable mass holds immense potential, its adoption remains plagued by a series of hurdles within the Pentagon. One hurdle that merits discussion comes from the Air Force.
Attritable Mass cannot be treated like crewed aircraft
Attritable mass represents a paradigm shift in military strategy, offering the ability to saturate enemy defenses with a multitude of low-cost, expendable platforms. These systems can perform a variety of missions, from reconnaissance and surveillance to electronic warfare and strike capabilities, all while minimizing risk to human operators. However, the Air Force's entrenched safety culture—inarguably vital for crewed aircraft—has inadvertently created barriers to the adoption of attritable solutions.
One of the key challenges lies in the application of airworthiness standards, which are designed for high-value, crewed aircraft, to small drones that cost a fraction of the price. This approach results in overly strict policies and regulations that stifle innovation and drive up costs.
Forcing attritable systems to adhere to the same rigorous standards as multi-million dollar aircraft not only slows down the development process but also undermines the affordability and scalability that are central to the attritable mass concept.
Addressing this issue and unlock the full potential of attritable mass requires a fundamental shift in mindset.
Rather than treating attritable systems as traditional aircraft, they should be viewed and regulated as munitions—for that is what they are. Just as munitions are designed to be expendable and replaced as needed, attritable systems should be subject to a separate set of standards and regulations that prioritize affordability, simplicity, and rapid production.
By adopting this approach, the Air Force can streamline the acquisition process, reduce bureaucratic overhead, and accelerate the fielding of attritable solutions.
This would not only enhance the Air Force's operational capabilities but also open up new opportunities for collaboration with industry partners and innovative startups.
Conclusion
The adoption of attritable mass has the potential to revolutionize military operations, but its realization requires overcoming internal hurdles within the Department of Defense and services. The Air Force’s insistence and confusion over application of air worthiness standards highlights one example of the hurdles hindering the speed of adoption that we need.
Treating attritable systems as munitions that they are rather than as aircraft, alows the services to unleash the full power of attritable mass and stay at the forefront of modern warfare.
Keep building,
Andrew
Thank you. I hope this perspective gains traction. Even as a military Goliath, we need David's nimbleness and adaptability to compete.